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Can COVID-19 Teach Us How to End
Mass Incarceration?
AMY FETTIG*
In this essay, the author argues that federal, state and local
government response to the COVID-19 epidemic in prisons
and jails was largely incompetent, inhumane, and contrary
to sound public health policy, resulting in preventable death
and suffering for both incarcerated people and corrections
staff. However, the lessons learned from these failures provide a roadmap for policy priorities and legal reform in our
ongoing need to decarcerate and end the era of mass incarceration, including: (1) rolling back extreme sentences, recalibrating sentences generally and providing for “second
look” mechanisms to those currently serving sentences beyond 10 years; (2) ensuring that decarceration efforts center
racial justice as a goal both prospectively and retrospectively; and (3) promoting voting rights for all incarcerated
people and those living in the community with a felony conviction.

Amy Fettig is the Executive Director of The Sentencing Project in Washington,
DC, a research and advocacy organization working to end mass incarceration and
promote racial, gender and economic justice.
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INTRODUCTION
The history of America’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic
will not be pretty. In some respects, we might look to the wondrous
accomplishments of science, the speedy discovery and production
of the vaccine, and the resilience of millions of individuals responding to the economic and human costs of the virus with care and creativity. In other respects, however, we find widespread incompetence, indifference, opportunism, and sheer inhumanity that inflicted
preventable suffering and death in communities across the nation,
especially communities of color. The plight of the millions of people
trapped in our prisons during the pandemic surely fits in the latter
category.
Serious and sustained thought and analysis should be given to
both our successes and our failures in dealing with the COVID-19
pandemic. Hopefully, lessons will be learned, and actions will be
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taken to better prepare for the next global human challenge we will
inevitably face. But closer to home, there are some immediate and
dire lessons to learn. Furthermore, there are legal and policy choices
we must make with respect to our criminal justice system—choices
to not only save lives, but also bring the system to a more rational,
human-centered approach to crime and punishment.
In this essay, I examine what has been happening inside prisons
during the pandemic; the inadequate official responses to those conditions; the punitive excess in our criminal legal system that fostered
this inadequate response; and what we can learn from these failures
to implement concrete systematic change that will help end the era
of mass incarceration in the United States.
I.

WHAT HAPPENED TO INCARCERATED PEOPLE DURING THE
PANDEMIC?
Thousands of incarcerated people were killed by the pandemic, 1
but they are not just statistics. It is important to remember that the
tragic and overwhelming number of deaths caused by the pandemic,
and our response to it, are ultimately about individual lives cut short.
Take the life of Clarence Givens as an example. 2 Clarence was a
long-time correspondent with my office because of our work with
individuals serving extreme sentences. 3 Unfortunately, Clarence
was also an exemplar of the irrationality of America’s extreme punishment paradigm.
In 1996, the State of Wisconsin sentenced him to the ludicrous
sentence of 110 years in prison “for selling less than three grams of
heroin to an undercover informant.” 4 Because Clarence had
previously comitted nonviolent offenses, the State charged him as a
COVID Behind Bars Data Project, UCLA L. BEHIND BARS DATA
PROJECT, https://uclacovidbehindbars.org/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) (collecting
and analyzing public information about the coronavirus pandemic in prisons, jails,
youth facilities and immigration detention centers across the United States).
2
Clarence Givens’ story is set forth more fully in my colleague’s recent publication. See ASHLEY NELLIS, NO END IN SIGHT: AMERICA’S ENDURING RELIANCE
ON LIFE IMPRISONMENT 20–22 (2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/No-End-in-Sight-Americas-Enduring-Reliance-onLife-Imprisonment.pdf.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 20.
1
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habitual offender, meaning he was eligible for a much longer
sentence “regardless of the severity of his present offense.” 5 Such
habitual offender laws have a long and checkered history of being
both disproportionately inflicted on Black defendants like Clarence 6
and having little to no deterrent value, especially for drug-related
crimes. 7 Ultimately, habitual offender laws have normalized extreme and irrational sentences that in no way present a balanced approach to justice while also depriving individuals and communities
of freedom for minimal, if any, public safety benefit.
During his long incarceration, Clarence developed prostate cancer and underwent two hip replacement surgeries. 8 As a result of
these surgeries, he was eventually confined to a wheelchair. 9 Frail
and sick, Clarence spent years in prison but maintained an exemplary record. 10 As the threat of COVID-19 advanced across the
country, Clarence—like so many others desperate to avoid the ravages of the virus in institutional settings—naturally sought his release through official channels. 11 As an older person with pre-existing health issues, Clarence was especially vulnerable to the virus
and did not present a threat to the community. 12 As the pandemic
raged through Wisconsin prisons, Clarence’s family wanted him to
come home so that he could live in a safer environment. 13 But no
government mercy was given to Clarence. 14 Instead, in November
2020, he developed a high fever. 15 His cellmate wrote to my office
5

Id.
See, e.g., Charles Crawford et al., Race, Racial Threat, and Sentencing of
Habitual Offenders, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 481, 503 (1998) (“Logistic regression
showed that defendants with longer prior records or more serious criminal charges
were more likely sentenced as habitual, as were defendants from places with a
higher percentage of black residents. But after the effects of these factors and others are accounted for, it is clear that race does indeed matter in habitual offender
sentencing.”).
7
See Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry,
86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10, 11 (1995).
8
NELLIS, supra note 2, at 20.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
6
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and described how other prisoners in their housing pod donated vitamins and tea to try and nurse Clarence back to health. 16 Unfortunately, Clarence was admitted to the hospital the day after this letter
was sent. 17 Within twenty-four hours of his admission, Clarence was
unconscious and breathing on a respirator. 18 On December 7, 2020,
he died of COVID-19 at the age of sixty-eight. 19
Clarence’s tragic and likely preventable death represents one of
the thousands of lives lost in our prisons and jails. 20 American correctional institutions are uniquely unable to control respiratory diseases, such as COVID-19, because of poor ventilation, overcrowding that makes social distancing impossible, poor sanitation, and indifferent––or worse––access to appropriate medical care. 21 Early in
the pandemic, correctional institutions in states across the country
failed to provide masks and other personal protective equipment,
consistently test inmates and staff for COVID-19, and adequately
quarantine those who did test positive. 22 As a result of these prevailing conditions and leadership failures, correctional institutions have
been Petri dishes for the pandemic. 23 In fact, incarcerated individuals “have been 5.5 times more likely to get COVID-19 and have
suffered a COVID-19 mortality rate 3 times higher than the general
public.” 24 The most recent count, based on available data, indicates
that more than 2,300 people have died of COVID-19 in prisons and
jails, and this is likely an under-count. 25
16

Id.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
See COVID Behind Bars Data Project, supra note 1.
21
Emily Widra & Dylan Hayre, Failing Grades: States’ Responses to
COVID-19 in Jails & Prisons, ACLU (June 25, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/report/failing-grades-states-responses-covid-19-jails-prisons.
22
Id.
23
See id.; UNLOCK THE BOX, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IS NEVER THE
ANSWER 3 (2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a9446a89d5abbfa670
13da7/t/5ee7c4f1860e0d57d0ce8195/1592247570889/June2020Report.pdf.
24
Emily Widra, New Data Gives a Detailed Picture of How COVID-19 Increased Death Rates in Florida Prisons, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Apr. 27,
2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2021/04/27/florida-prison-mortality/.
25
ERIKA TYAGI ET AL., A CRISIS OF UNDERTAKING: HOW INADEQUATE
COVID-19 DETECTION SKEWS THE DATA AND COSTS LIVES 6 (2021),
https://uclacovidbehindbars.org/assets/cfr_report_final.pdf
(collecting
and
17
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There are many medically vulnerable people, like Clarence, living behind bars. 26 In the era of mass incarceration, extreme sentences keep large numbers of people in prison for longer periods of
time. 27 Indeed, we now have more people—over 200,000—serving
life or virtual life sentences in American prisons than comprised our
entire prison population in 1970. 28 As prison populations have increased so too has the age of those making up the prison populations. 29 In fact, between 2000 and 2016, the percentage of people in
state prisons who are fifty-five years of age or older more than tripled resulting in nearly 150,000 older Americans in those institutions. 30 Older adults have been hit the hardest by the COVID-19
pandemic. 31 People sixty-five and older face the greatest risk of hospitalization and death due to COVID-19, accounting for nearly 80%
of all COVID-19 deaths as of September 29, 2021. 32 The risks for
older adults are even more pronounced among the incarcerated as
they tend to suffer from more chronic health conditions than their
free world counterparts. 33 The combination of poor access to medical care and the stress of prison life means that by age fifty, incarcerated people often exhibit health problems more commonly seen
in people many years older. 34 Thus, it should come as no surprise
that the incarcerated population is extremely vulnerable to COVID19.

analyzing public information about impact of COVID-19 in prisons, jails, youth
facilities, and immigration detention centers across United States).
26
See, e.g., Weihua Li & Nicole Lewis, This Chart Shows Why the Prison
Population Is So Vulnerable to COVID-19, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 19, 2020,
2:45 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/03/19/this-chart-showswhy-the-prison-population-is-so-vulnerable-to-covid-19.
27
See id.
28
NELLIS, supra note 2, at 4.
29
See id.
30
Li & Lewis, supra note 26.
31
Meredith Freed et al., COVID-19 Deaths Among Older Adults During the
Delta Surge Were Higher in States with Lower Vaccination Rates, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/covid-19-deathsamong-older-adults-during-the-delta-surge-were-higher-in-states-with-lowervaccination-rates/.
32
Id.
33
Li & Lewis, supra note 26.
34
Id.
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Due to the nature of COVID-19, the vulnerability of the incarcerated population, and the conditions of our prisons, these institutions have become leading hotspots for COVID-19. 35 Moreover, the
movement of staff between correctional facilities and their communities, coupled with the close contact between staff and incarcerated
people, enables the virus to spread into and out of these facilities. 36
According to The Marshall Project, more than 114,000 prison staff
members nationwide had tested positive for COVID-19 by June
2021. 37 As of May 2021, One Voice, a nonprofit group that tracks
correctional officers’ deaths, found that 219 officers and forty-one
correctional staff had died of COVID-19 since March 2020. 38 In
contrast, the group notes that in a typical year, “about eleven officers
lose their lives” while on duty. 39
While the pandemic transformed prisons into hotbeds of infection and death, incarcerated people were subject to increasingly dire
conditions. 40 Many prisons reacted to the pandemic by locking facilities down or leaving prisoners in solitary or near-solitary-like
conditions of severe isolation and immobility for months at a time. 41
Both Solitary Watch and the Marshall Project found that at least
300,000 people were placed in solitary since the advent of the pandemic, a stunning increase of nearly 500% over pre-pandemic levels. 42 Likewise, facilities ended visitation, isolating many incarcerated people from friends and family—a reality that continues to endure. 43 And programs in facilities were suspended, which left
35
Eddie Burkhalter et al., Incarcerated and Infected: How the Virus Tore
Through the U.S. Prison System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2021), https://www.nytim
es.com/interactive/2021/04/10/us/covid-prison-outbreak.html (noting that correctional facilities have been outbreak clusters in the United States).
36
A State-By-State Look at 15 Months of Coronavirus in Prison, MARSHALL
PROJECT (July 1, 2021, 1:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/
01/a-state-by-state-look-at-coronavirus-in-prisons.
37
Id.
38
Luke Barr, More Than 250 Correctional Officers Died From COVID-19,
ABC NEWS (May 14, 2021, 4:34 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/250-correction
al-officers-died-covid-19/story?id=77689370.
39
Id.
40
See, e.g., UNLOCK THE BOX, supra note 23, at 1.
41
Id. at 3.
42
Id. at 1, 4.
43
Cary Aspinwall et al., How Prisons in Each State Are Restricting Visits
Due to Coronavirus, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 30, 2021, 10:15 AM),
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individual prisoners suffering from extreme idleness and delayed the
possibility of early release for other prisoners who needed to complete these programs for such consideration. 44 On top of all this,
staffing shortages at all levels not only mean that lockdowns in facilities are more common, 45 but also that basic services, such as
medical and mental health care, have worsened––even where care is
often routinely bad to begin with. 46
COVID-19 created a perfect storm of toxic conditions that challenged prisons and the outside community to avert a humanitarian
crisis. The response to this crisis tells us much about what ails the
criminal legal system and our continued inability to confront and
end mass incarceration in any meaningful way.

https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/03/17/tracking-prisons-response-tocoronavirus.
44
See, e.g., Paul DeBenedetto, Despite Call to Lower Prison Populations
Amid COVID-19, Some Freeze Early Release Programs, INDEPTH (Aug. 13,
2020, 8:28 PM), https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/criminaljustice/2020/08/13/379718/despite-calls-to-lower-prison-populations-amid-cov
id-19-some-freeze-early-release-programs/; Peter Medlin, COVID Shut Down
Most Prison Education Programs. Here’s How Incarcerated Students Have Kept
Learning, N. PUB RADIO (Apr. 13, 2021, 6:02 AM), https://www.northernpublicradio.org/education/2021-04-13/covid-shut-down-most-prison-educationprograms-heres-how-incarcerated-students-have-kept-learning.
45
Alexandra Marquez & Jordan Smith, America’s Federal Prisons Face a
Massive Shortage of Workers, CNBC (Aug. 16, 2021, 2:58 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/video/2021/08/16/americas-federal-prisons-face-a-massive-shortage-of-workers.html (noting that severe worker shortages in some federal prisons require prison workers like cooks and counselors to work as correctional officers); Associated Press, Inmates Spend More Time in Cells Because of
Staff Shortages, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 7, 2021), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/kansas/articles/2021-10-07/inmates-spend-moretime-in-cells-because-of-staff-shortages (detailing increased cell lock down and
less access to programs due to staff shortages in Kansas); Ali Oshinskie, DOC
Unions Concerned About Staff Shortages in Prisons, CT MIRROR (Sept. 15, 2021),
https://ctmirror.org/2021/09/15/doc-unions-concerned-about-staff-shortages-inprisons/ (staffing shortages exacerbated by pandemic in Connecticut Department
of Corrections raising safety concerns for officer union).
46
See Keri Blakinger, Prisons Have a Health Care Issue — And It Starts at
the Top, Critics Say, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 1, 2021, 6:00 AM) https://www.
themarshallproject.org/2021/07/01/prisons-have-a-health-care-issue-and-itstarts-at-the-top-critics-say.
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II.

HOW DID GOVERNMENTS RESPOND TO THE COVID-19
CRISIS BEHIND BARS?
The public health threat that COVID-19 presented to our correctional institutions was immediately obvious. Even before they became coronavirus hotspots, medical, public health, and criminal justice experts and practitioners called for substantial depopulation in
these facilities because prison infrastructure and policies are incompatible with basic Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines and the heightened health vulnerability of incarcerated populations to the virus. 47 Early recognition of the problem, however, did
not lead to sufficient measures to ameliorate conditions that would
prevent suffering and death. 48 Instead, the response of federal, state,
and local governments was largely characterized by a disorganized
and piecemeal approach that failed to provide meaningful and comprehensive strategies, such as lowering the population in prisons, to
confront the predictable spread of the virus. 49
And once a vaccine was developed, very few states and jurisdictions prioritized incarcerated people for vaccination, despite public
calls to protect one of our most demonstrably vulnerable populations. 50

See, e.g., NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENG’G, & MED. ET AL.,
DECARCERATING CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES DURING COVID-19: ADVANCING
HEALTH, EQUITY, AND SAFETY 11–19 (Emily A. Wang et al. eds., 2020),
https://www.nap.edu/read/25945/chapter/1 (addressing “importance of depopulating congregate living and working areas, particularly high-risk settings like correctional facilities”).
48
Id. at 102.
49
See Oluwadamilola T. Oladeru et al., A Call to Protect Patients, Correctional Staff and Healthcare Professionals in Jails and Prisons During the COVID19 Pandemic, 8 HEALTH & J. 17, 17 (2020) (“The United States’ uneven, piecemeal race to ‘flatten the curve’ has highlighted its own weaknesses in its ability
to respond to a pandemic. Nowhere are these weaknesses more apparent than in
U.S. correctional facilities.”).
50
See Tiana Herring & Emily Widra, Just Over Half of Incarcerated People
are Vaccinated, Despite Being Locked in Covid-19 Epicenters, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (May 18, 2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2021/05/18/vaccinationrates/ (noting that most states did not prioritize vaccination for incarcerated people, despite case rates of COVID-19 being four to five times higher than
general population, resulting in just 55% of people in prison being vaccinated
seven months after vaccines were first distributed).
47
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Taken together, these failures demonstrate blind spots in our collective responsibility towards our fellow human beings. Furthermore, these shortcomings highlight why mass incarceration writ
large has been such an intractable issue, despite widespread understanding that its human and fiscal costs cannot be justified for an
alleged public safety benefit. An examination of these failures during the COVID-19 pandemic reveals the key areas that require rethinking if our goal is to create a more humane and just legal system
that focuses on decarceration.
A.
The Failure to Adequately Decarcerate
A consensus report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine issued recommendations that prisons can
employ to limit the number of people exposed to the virus while also
protecting the broader communities to which these individuals
return. 51 First, it recommended that meaningful and effective decarceration amidst the pandemic could limit the number of people exposed to the virus while also protecting the broader communities to
which these individuals return. 52 The report went on to recommend
that the correctional officials and public health authorities assess the
population levels of their facilities in order to follow the public
health guidelines. 53 Factors to consider during this assessment include overcrowding, the physical design of the facilities, current
prison conditions, and delivery of health services to the incarcerated
population. 54 The report also set out clear guidelines for implementing COVID-19 testing and facilitating quarantines in the community
for fourteen days (if needed) before released individuals could return to their families or group housing. 55 It further recommended the
development of plans to ensure a safe re-entry for incarcerated persons to communities that include identifying housing resources; addressing access to public benefits, such as the Supplemental

51

4–8.

52
53
54
55

NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENG’G, & MED. ET AL., supra note 47, at
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 7.
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Nutrition Assistance Program; and working with community health
systems for access to health care. 56
Sensible policy options were and are available to federal, state,
and local leaders to confront COVID-19 behind bars. 57 But very few
comprehensive policies were put in place to reduce the public health
threat that conditions of confinement in prisons and jails present to
the people who live and work in these institutions and the communities in which they are located. 58 Instead of viewing the pandemic
as a chance to comprehensively decarcerate our bloated prisons, jurisdictions adopted a mish-mash of early release mechanisms, enhanced earned time credits, increased compassionate release, and
occasionally sentence commutations.
These measures did result in some releases. But most were directed at a limited population that did not allow for the most vulnerable to be released. 59 In the state prisons, even some of the most
expansive measures, such as New Jersey’s Senate Bill 2519,60
which led to the release of more than 2,000 people, 61 was limited to
incarcerated adults or youth within 365 days of scheduled release
and excluded people sentenced for murder and certain sex offenses,
regardless of whether they, too, were close to release. 62 Similarly, in
Virginia, a budget amendment allowed the director of the Department of Corrections to release some imprisoned people with less
Id. at 96–98.
See id. at 14 (recognizing the various strategies available to protect people
in correctional facilities, such as decarceration, physical distancing, and implementation of testing protocols).
58
See, e.g., Danielle Wallace, Correctional Officers Are Driving the Pandemic in Prisons, CONVERSATION (Aug. 18, 2021, 8:12 AM), https://theconversation.com/correctional-officers-are-driving-the-pandemic-in-prisons-164741
(noting correlation between increased COVID-19 infection rates in prison and
surrounding community).
59
See Keri Blakinger & Joseph Neff, 31,000 Prisoners Sought Compassionate Release During COVID-19. The Bureau of Prisons Approved 36, MARSHALL
PROJECT (June 11, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2021/06/
11/31-000-prisoners-sought-compassionate-release-during-covid-19-the-bureauof-prisons-approved-36 (“[W]ardens denied nearly 23,000 requests because the
person ‘does not meet criteria.’”).
60
S. 2519, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2020).
61
Tracey Tully, 2,258 N.J. Prisoners Will be Released in a Single Day, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/04/nyregion/nj-prisoner-release-covid.html.
62
N.J. S. 2519.
56
57
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than one year left on their sentence, but this measure excluded people sentenced to a Class 1 felony or a sexually violent offense. 63 In
Washington, D.C., a notably progressive jurisdiction, the City
Council modified its criminal code to expand eligibility for compassionate release during the pandemic to those who have served at
least twenty years in prison and are at least sixty years old. 64 The
amended version allows individuals to cite their age, health, or other
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” as justification to petition
the court for release. 65 Although the new law does not include any
explicit carve-outs for the nature of conviction, the D.C. Court of
Appeals temporarily blocked the release of a person with a rape conviction, despite a lower court ruling that his health condition justified release under the law. 66 The law’s requirement that most petitioners demonstrate service of at least 20 years also broadly limits
its applicability. 67 Moreover, court data demonstrates that although
the D.C. courts adjudicated 562 release requests by July 2021, only
176 people had been granted release under the emergency provisions enacted in the spring of 2020. 68
Orders to reduce incarcerated populations by governors also
broadly restricted release to persons with nonviolent offenses or
those nearing release. 69 For example, in California, early releases
were first allowed for people serving sentences “for non-violent offenses, who do not have to register as a sex offender, and who had

Press Release, Virginia Dep’t of Corr., Legislature Approves Authority for
Virginia DOC to Release Some Offenders Early During Pandemic (Apr. 24,
2020), https://vadoc.virginia.gov/news-press-releases/2020/legislature-approvesauthority-for-virginia-doc-to-release-some-offenders-early-during-pandemic/.
64
Omnibus Public Safety and Justice Amendment Act of 2020, ch. 403, sec.
1203, § 24-403, 68 D.C. Reg. 19 (2021) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 24403.04 (2021)).
65
D.C. CODE § 24-403.04 (2021).
66
Paul Duggan, D.C. Appeals Court Halts Covid-Related ‘Compassionate
Release’ of Convicted Rapist, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2021, 5:20 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/court-blocks-prison-covidrelease/2021/08/10/be3d63de-f6ce-11eb-9738-8395ec2a44e7_story.html.
67
§ 24-403.04.
68
Duggan, supra note 66.
69
Widra & Hayre, supra note 21.
63
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60 days or less to serve” in April 2020. 70 Then, in July 2020 this was
expanded to those with 180 days or less to serve on their prison
term. 71 In Kentucky, the Governor signed executive orders commuting the sentences of 352 people sentenced to low-level felonies. 72
And in Maryland, the Governor signed an executive order authorizing early release to elderly persons and those nearing the completion
of their sentence but precluded those convicted of sexual offenses
from eligibility. 73
Government action at the federal level also proved entirely inadequate. Federal prisoners have been afforded only two possibilities for release: home confinement and compassionate release. 74 In
March 2020, Congress expanded the eligibility criteria for home
confinement and the Attorney General ordered Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) officials to let more people go. 75 As a result, 23,700 were
sent home. 76 But as the pandemic swept through the BOP, thousands
began seeking compassionate release. 77 The number of petitions
skyrocketed from 1,735 in 2019 to nearly 31,000 since the onset of
the virus. 78 Despite the need for urgency, however, the BOP director
approved only thirty-six requests, even less than the fifty-five such
requests approved in 2019 before the onset of the pandemic. 79 Fortunately, the federal courts have stepped in and granted

Actions to Reduce Population and Maximize Space, CAL. DEP’T OF
CORRECTIONS & REHAB., https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/covid19/frequently-askedquestions-expedited-releases/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2021).
71
Id.
72
Joe Sonka, Gov. Beshear Commutes Sentences of Additional 352 State Inmates in Response to COVID-19, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Apr. 28, 2020, 10:20
AM), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/2020/04/28/beshearcommutes-sentences-352-kentucky-inmates-response-covid-19/3038367001/.
73
Office of Governor Lawrence J. Hogan, Jr., Implementing Alternative Correctional Detention and Supervision, Md. Exec. Order No. 20-11-17-30 (Nov. 17,
2020), https://governor.maryland.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Prisoner-Release-RENEWAL-11.17.20.pdf.
74
Blakinger & Neff, supra note 59.
75
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136,
§ 12003(b)(2), 134 Stat. 281, 516 (2020).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
70
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compassionate release to several thousand people, despite BOP’s intransigence. 80
For context, prisons nationwide oversaw a growth in their confined population by more than 700% between year ends 1972 and
2009. 81 By May 2020, state prisons, which confine more than half
of incarcerated individuals, had decreased their confined population
by only 4% (from 1,260,393 to 1,207,710).82 At the federal level,
the BOP downsized its incarcerated population by just 14% between
March and November 2020 (from 175,315 to 154,396), remaining
dangerously overcrowded. 83 By October 2021, that population had
increased to 156,098 people. 84
It is worth noting that decarceration of jails was more successful
at the beginning of the pandemic. 85 Jurisdictions initially controlled
admissions by giving citations rather than formal arrests; ensuring
that most offenses did not result in custodial holds; and suspending
low-level arrests. 86 As a result, jail populations were reduced by
22% between January 2020 and July 2020 (from 738,400 to 575,952
people). 87 But since then, populations have again risen as jurisdictions discontinued population reduction measures. 88 The result of
these lax policies is that from June 2020 to March 2021, local jail
populations rebounded by 73,800 to a total of 647,200 people—a
population increase of 13% in just nine months.89 The return to pre80

Id.
Carlos Franco-Paredes et al., Decarceration and Community Re-entry in
the COVID-19 Era, 21 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES e10, e11 (2021), https://
www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S1473-3099%2820%2930730-1.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Federal Inmate Population Statistics, FED. BUREAU PRISONS,
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/population_statistics.jsp#pop_report_cont
(last updated Oct. 28, 2021).
85
JACOB KANG-BROWN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., PEOPLE IN JAIL AND
PRISON IN SPRING 2021 1 (2021), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/
people-in-jail-and-prison-in-spring-2021.pdf.
86
JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON CRIME, ARRESTS,
AND JAIL POPULATIONS A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 12 (2020), http://www.jfaassociates.com/publications/jss/Impact%20of%20COVID-19%20on%20Crime
%20(prelim).pdf.
87
Franco-Paredes et al., supra note 81, at e11.
88
See KANG-BROWN ET AL., supra note 85, at 1.
89
Id.
81
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pandemic policies is especially disconcerting in light of the evidence
that the decreased jail population helped to reduce the spread of the
virus without harming public safety. 90
Beyond the failure to decarcerate a sufficient number of people
to save lives both inside and outside prisons, troubling evidence
emerged that decarceration during the pandemic was exacerbating
racial disparities. 91 Sadly, this evidence was not surprising. For example, analyses examining these racial disparities in Illinois and
Connecticut found that the number of white people who were decarcerated during the pandemic is substantially higher than the number
of Black people decarcerated during this period. 92 Likewise, research has found that incarceration for alleged offenses that could
be safely managed without incarceration in the community has
likely harmed public safety and has increased racial health disparities during the pandemic. 93 These findings further support the growing consensus among public health experts that large-scale decarceration as a response to COVID-19 should be implemented to protect incarcerated people and to mitigate the spread of both the virus
and any increase in racial disparities as a result of the impact of
COVID-19. 94 Similarly, experts believe that decarceration is a key
element for policies related to biosecurity and pandemic preparedness. 95
Another glaring government misstep in the pandemic response
in prisons is that some states are still attempting to build more prisons rather than reducing prison populations, in spite of the deadly
lessons that states should have drawn from the pandemic. 96 The approach in Nebraska, a state with the second most overcrowded
See Kelly Servick, Pandemic Inspires New Push to Shrink Jails and Prisons, SCI. (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.science.org/content/article/pandemic-inspires-new-push-shrink-jails-and-prisons.
91
See Franco-Paredes et al., supra note 81, at e13.
92
Id. at e11.
93
Eric Reinhart & Daniel L. Chen, Carceral-Community Epidemiology,
Structural Racism, and COVID-19 Disparities, PNAS, May 25, 2021, at 1.
94
See id.
95
Id.
96
See, e.g., Paul Hammel, Nebraska Moves Forward with Plan for New $230
Million Prison to Relieve Overcrowding, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Apr. 23,
2021), https://omaha.com/news/state-and-regional/crime-and-courts/nebraskamoves-forward-with-plan-for-new-230-million-prison-to-relieve-overcrowding/
article_3f6318b2-43c1-11eb-aae3-478f84b04353.html.
90
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system in the country (after Alabama), is a prime example. 97 Nebraska reduced its prison population during the pandemic by a mere
6% from the end of 2019 through March 2021. 98 Instead of expanding decarceration efforts, the Nebraska Department of Correctional
Services proposed building a new prison, and the governor vetoed
legislation that would have made many people eligible for parole
earlier. 99 During this same period, Alabama’s dangerously overcrowded prison population declined by a modest 11%. 100 Rather
than using the opportunity afforded by the pandemic to solve the
longstanding problems of Alabama’s bloated prison system, Governor Kay Ivey is instead planning to build three new prisons at a cost
of $1.3 billion. 101 Alabama’s state legislature is attempting to offset
this enormous cost by using approximately $400 million of the
state’s share of federal pandemic relief funds. 102 At the same time,
the legislature failed to pass proposed sentencing reforms that could
have reduced long-standing overcrowding without new facilities.103
B.

The Failure to Prioritize Vaccination for Incarcerated
Populations
The stunning failure to protect incarcerated populations through
decarceration during the pandemic might have been partially offset
by the stunning scientific victory that lead to the development of the
COVID-19 vaccine and its release in December 2020. 104 This
97

Id.
KANG-BROWN ET AL., supra note 85, at 6. Only three states reduced their
prison populations by less than 10% during the pandemic: Arkansas (down 9.4%);
Mississippi (down 9.1%), and Nebraska (down 6%). Id. at 13–14.
99
Id.
100
See id. at 6.
101
Kim Chandler, Alabama Trying to Use COVID Relief Funds for New Prisons, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 27, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/coronaviruspandemic-business-prisons-montgomery-kay-ivey-8a7d30c43f4e61987051368a
9604fda9.
102
Id.
103
Brian Lyman, Alabama Legislative Leaders See Possibility of Special Session on Prisons, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (May 19, 2021, 11:38 AM),
https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/2021/05/19/alabama-legislative-special-session-prison-construction-possible/5162045001/.
104
See Katie Rose Quandt, Incarcerated People and Corrections Staff Should
Be Prioritized in COVID-19 Vaccination Plans, PRISON POL’Y INST. (Dec. 8,
2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/12/08/covid-vaccination-plans/.
98
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achievement has given many people hope that the death and suffering caused by the virus behind bars might soon be ameliorated. 105
By any measure, incarcerated people should have been high on the
priority list to receive the vaccine. It was clear very early in the pandemic that the infection rate in prisons was much higher than that in
the general population, and that the virus was much deadlier to
prison populations. 106 Despite this data, in a November 2020 study
conducted by the Prison Policy Institute, only ten states included incarcerated people in their phase 1 vaccine distribution plans, and
eight states failed to list incarcerated people in any phase of vaccine
distribution.107 Correctional institutions have been slow to offer vaccines to incarcerated people, 108 and both incarcerated people and
staff have been slow to agree to vaccination. 109 The reasons for this
reluctance are likely multi-faceted, but many point to the widespread
distrust of prison officials and prison medical treatment, the lack of
basic public health education, information given to incarcerated
populations by corrections systems, and entrenched political views
and polarization of corrections staff members. 110 Regardless of the
reason, by mid-May 2021, nationwide data for people in prisons established that only fifty percent of people in prisons had even received one dose of the vaccine. 111 As a result, there has been a significant number of preventable deaths among incarcerated people
and corrections staff. 112 In the state of Nevada, for example, one105

See id.
See Reinhart & Chen, supra note 93, at 6.
107
Quandt, supra note 104.
108
See Herring & Widra, supra note 50.
109
Sarah N. Lynch, Vaccinated Prisoners, Unvaccinated Guards Illustrate
Biden’s Tricky Road Ahead, REUTERS (July 29, 2021, 5:02 PM), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/vaccinated-prisoners-unvaccinated-guards-illustrate-bidenstricky-road-2021-07-29/ (noting that only 50% of federal Bureau of Prisons employees had been fully vaccinated as of June 2021 despite being offered a shot
and that only 34% of staffers in a federal prison in Oakdale, Louisiana, where
70% of prisoners were vaccinated against coronavirus, had taken the shot due to
their political beliefs).
110
See, e.g., id. (“‘It’s just the distrust,’ said [Ronald] Morris, who told Reuters he decided it was best for him personally to get the [COVID-19] shot to protect his family. ‘It depends what side of the political spectrum you’re on or what
part of the country that you’re in.’”).
111
Herring & Widra, supra note 50.
112
See Reinhart & Chen, supra note 93, at 6.
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third of COVID deaths in prisons occurred in 2021 after the vaccines
became available. 113
These glaring examples of government incompetence and indifference have characterized much of corrections policy both before
and during the pandemic. Indeed, the overriding ethos of mass incarceration barely faltered despite the unprecedented challenge, suffering, and death that COVID-19 presents to correctional institutions and surrounding communities. Even when an opportunity to
minimize harm arose with the arrival of the vaccine, intentional indifference continued to characterize government response to saving
the lives of incarcerated people.
III.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE
PANDEMIC THAT MIGHT INFORM ONGOING EFFORTS TO END MASS
INCARCERATION
Over a year into the pandemic, mass incarceration continues to
thrive in America. 114 The current data available from the Vera Institute of Justice estimates that the total number of people incarcerated
in federal and state prisons and local jails dropped by 14% from approximately 2.1 million in 2019 to about 1.8 million by June 2020,
followed by a small decline of 2% by March 2021. 115 These numbers reflect an abstract and unfulfilled story of what drives mass incarceration, and our inability to reform our corrections systems––or
handle a life-threatening crisis in a rational and humane way.
Any honest evaluation of the lessons learned from the pandemic
and its impact on our efforts to end mass incarceration must start
with the individuals who are directly impacted. For me, that means
understanding what happened to Clarence Givens in the Wisconsin
system. Examining Clarence’s case, the first question must be: why
is anyone serving a 110-year sentence in the first place? And the
second must be: what possible public safety reasons are there for
keeping a wheelchair bound sixty-eight-year-old in prison?
Related to both Clarence’s extreme sentence as a “habitual offender” and to his callous treatment at the hands of Wisconsin’s Department of Corrections is the fact that he was Black. Wisconsin has
113
114
115

Herring & Widra, supra note 50.
See, e.g., KANG-BROWN ET AL., supra note 85, at 1.
Id.
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the highest Black imprisonment rates in the nation. 116 One in every
thirty-six Black people in Wisconsin is behind bars. 117 This is a
larger rate of Black incarceration than the national average, where
one in every eighty-one Black adults is serving time in state
prison. 118 Race permeates all aspects of our criminal legal system; 119
it brought Clarence to prison for a 110-year sentence, and it likely
played a role in officials’ decision to keep him there despite his clear
vulnerability to COVID-19.
Clarence and his fellow incarcerated people were unable to express their outrage to elected government leaders or hold them accountable for the deplorable response to the pandemic in prisons and
the preventable suffering and death that resulted. 120 Without the
check of the ballot box, incarcerated people have little ability to influence criminal legal policy or reform. 121 The result is decades of
mass incarceration policies that go unchecked and politicians who
feel little compunction to serve the needs of all the people they allegedly represent in our democracy.
The failures stemming from the pandemic indicate there are
mass incarceration reforms that must be implemented moving forward: we must roll back extreme sentencing, recalibrate the excessive punitiveness of our entire punishment paradigm, and implement
routine mechanisms to return individuals to the community if they
are not an ongoing public safety threat. Most importantly, we must
center racial justice in all efforts to decarcerate if we are to actually
end mass incarceration and ensure that those most directly impacted
by the criminal legal system can participate in our democracy.

ASHLEY NELLIS, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY
STATE PRISONS 5 (2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-Justice-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
See, e.g., Franco-Paredes et al., supra note 81, at e10 (“Inequities in the US
criminal justice system stem from enduring the systemic effect of racial oppression . . . .”).
120
See generally infra Section III.C (analyzing effects of the systemic disenfranchisement of formerly and currently incarcerated populations on the democratic process).
121
Id.
116
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A.
Current extreme sentencing policies sustain mass
incarceration and must be reformed with shorter sentences and
opportunities for release.
During the pandemic, releases from correctional facilities have
been piecemeal and seemingly uninformed by either public health
or rational public safety goals. 122 Decarceration efforts focused on
people whose sentences were close to completion and individuals
with low-level convictions; however, these efforts excluded whole
categories of individuals with little regard for their vulnerability,
their actual risk to public safety if released, or the concrete numbers
of people who needed to be released in order to run correctional facilities safely. 123 In short, the official response to the pandemic
across many jurisdictions centered on extracting long sentences regardless of any justifiable public safety rationale. 124
In the disastrous handling of the pandemic behind bars, we can
see that our political leaders, corrections systems, and the public are
largely trapped in a mindset of “punitive excess.” 125 During the pandemic, this mindset became even more deadly for both incarcerated

See Franco-Paredes et al., supra note 81, at e12 (“Federal guidance on
COVID-19 for correctional facilities has had an inadequate effect in protecting
individuals who are susceptible SARS-CoV-2 by not recommending a substantial
population reduction in jails and prisons as a crucial intervention.”).
123
See id. at e11 (critiquing decarceration efforts implemented in response to
the COVID-19 pandemic).
124
See id. at e12 (“[T]he USA does not embrace scientific evidence that supports the depopulation of correctional facilities to mitigate the spread of the virus
and criminological evidence that suggests this policy would not harm public
safety.”).
125
Scholars Jeremy Travis and Bruce Western have described the era we live
in as one of “punitive excess.” See Jeremy Travis & Bruce Western, The Era of
Punitive Excess, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (April 13, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/era-punitive-excess. More people under
correctional supervision than at any other time in our history. Id. We have criminalized social problems, such as homelessness and mental illness, while using the
criminal legal system to support the legacy of white Supremacy in America by
further entrenching extreme punishment. See id. What has emerged is not only a
vast system of state supervision in both institutions and the community, but a sentencing policy focused on extreme and often mandatory sentences that bears little
relation to actual public safety needs. See id.
122
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people and corrections staff. 126 “Punitive excess” in our criminal legal system drives mass incarceration and shapes our policy priorities
and national orientation towards maximizing incarceration as a default practice––at any cost. 127
Our national tendency towards excessive punishment and extreme sentencing is demonstrated by the number of people now serving life or virtual life in prison. As previously mentioned, over
200,000 people are now serving life in prison, which is more than
the amount of people who served a prison sentence for any crime in
this country in 1970. 128 This statistic suggests one in seven people
in prison are serving a life term. 129 Additionally, “two-thirds of people serving life are people of color, with 46% Black and 16%
Latinx.” 130 Moreover, “[o]ne in 5 Black men in prison is serving a
life sentence . . . .” 131 Extreme sentences have also affected women:
one in every fifteen women in prison are serving a life sentence. 132
And because our addiction to long sentences started in the late
1980’s and early 1990’s, incarcerated individuals have grown old
behind bars at record rates; for example, 30% percent of people serving life sentences are aged fifty-five and older. 133
Given the data and the reality of the pandemic response to decarceration, how should we move forward in our attempts to end mass
incarceration? While there are so many lessons to learn from the
See generally Reinhart & Chen, supra note 93, at 1 (“During the COVID19 pandemic, American jails and prisons have predictably emerged as the world’s
leading sites of COVID-19 outbreaks.”).
127
See Travis & Western, supra note 125 (“[T]he ‘Era of Punitive Excess’
[is] . . . the modern expression of society’s need to marginalize the poor and people of color through criminalization and punishment [and] has become a stubborn
social fact.”).
128
See NELLIS, supra note 116, at 4.
129
Id. (noting the statistic includes those prisoners serving sentences of life
without parole, life with parole, and virtual life).
130
Id. at 18 (noting people of color serve life sentences at a disproportionate
measure).
131
Id. at 4.
132
Id. at 18. However, “[o]ne in 4 women in California prisons and one in 5
women in Massachusetts prisons has life.” Id. The number of women serving life
sentences has increased at a rate of almost one-third of that for men during the last
decade, even though only 3% of “lifers” are women. Id.
133
See id. at 20 (noting expansion of life sentences, prolonged time for parole
case review, and abolishment of parole have contributed to an increase in the elderly prison population).
126
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pandemic, it is clear there is a pressing need to lower the incarcerated population as quickly as possible. To meet this need, we must
rethink our entire sentencing structure. Research has made it clear
that lengthy sentences impede the elimination of mass incarceration
and even sustain it.134 For example, prison terms have lengthened
since the onset of our national preference for “punitive excess” despite evidence that long sentences: (1) incapacitate people after they
have “aged out” of criminal activity; (2) can be reviewed and reduced for most people with little effect on public safety; (3) have
limited deterrent value; and (4) detract from more effective investments in public safety. 135 Given this reality, rolling back extreme
sentencing must be a priority for leaders, advocates, and community
members concerned with ending mass incarceration.
The pandemic demonstrated both the paucity of current mechanisms for release 136 and the reluctance of local, state, and federal
officials to utilize the relatively few tools that now exist. 137 For this
reason, more effort and work must be put into developing “second
look” review mechanisms that allow courts, prosecutors, and parole
boards to reconsider the appropriateness of continued incarceration
for individuals who demonstrate they are ready to return home. 138 It
should not take the corrections system more than ten years to empower an individual with the skills necessary to live crime-free after
release. These reviews should be in line with other recommendations from national experts 139: automatically begin at ten years into
a sentence, “with a rebuttable presumption of resentencing,” and
“[s]ubsequent hearings should occur within a maximum of two
See, e.g., NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, A SECOND LOOK AT INJUSTICE 9 (2021),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/A-SecondLook-at-Injustice.pdf (noting the existence of “evidence that long prison terms are
not just inhumane and ineffective, but are in fact counterproductive to public
safety . . .”).
135
See id. at 4 (discussing rationales behind sentencing reform); see also id. at
10–12, for a more in-depth discussion on the ineffective nature of long sentences.
136
See id. at 29 (noting medical and compassionate release programs are available but rarely result in decarceration).
137
See id. at 32 (discussing New York’s “reluctance . . . to use medical parole
or commutations . . . [and] its decision to not prioritize COVID-19 vaccine access
to imprisoned people”).
138
See id. at 8 (examining the rationales behind “second look” legislation).
139
See, e.g., id. at 9 (listing faith groups, victim advocacy organizations, criminological experts, and legal experts who support extreme sentencing reform).
134
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years.” 140 Moreover, an individual’s crime of conviction should not
automatically prohibit a “second look” at their case. “Second look”
reviews should involve individualized, case-by-case expert evaluations rather than decisions based on political viability and calculations of political risk. 141 Most importantly, these reviews should analyze racial disparities in sentencing, discuss where racial disparities
are likely to arise, and suggest actions to correct these disparities
where they are found. 142
Shortening excessive prison terms and expediting releases will
help us both end mass incarceration and mitigate the harm of the
next pandemic.
B.
Achieving and accelerating racial justice and eliminating
racial disparities must be a goal of any effort to decarcerate.
Another key lesson of the pandemic is that racial justice must
always be centered in any effort to end mass incarceration. The slow
and inadequate response to the pandemic in correctional institutions
confirmed the concern shared by many lawyers and advocates: that
systemic racial disparities in our prisons and jails, and underlying
structural racism in the criminal legal system, could lead to incompetent and even fatal treatment of the incarcerated population.143
Tragically, these concerns were legitimized when elected leaders
and government officials proved unwilling to take the necessary
steps to decarcerate in order to save lives. 144
Decarceration efforts during the pandemic failed to address racial disparities or confront racial injustice in the criminal legal

Id. at 34.
See id.
142
Id.
143
See Franco-Paredes et al., supra note 81, at e10 (noting laws and policies
behind mass incarceration deepen racial disparities, which in turn cause health
issues such as suicidal ideology, drug and alcohol addiction, and an increased risk
in internal diseases).
144
See Reinhart & Chen, supra note 93, at 1 (“early warnings from public
health experts were followed by delayed and inadequate policy action”); see also
Franco-Paredes et al., supra note 81, at e11 (“In response to the growing number
of COVID-19 outbreaks in these facilities, public health experts, civil rights attorneys, and advocacy groups have made urgent appeals for prison depopulation.”).
140
141
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system. 145 This fact is all the more surprising given the ongoing racial reckoning in this country that began with the murder of George
Floyd, an unarmed African American man in Minneapolis, at the
hands of police officer, Derek Chauvin. 146 Despite greater public
awareness of the role of racism in the policing of Black communities, this awareness did not translate into policies focused on the impacts of structural racism present in our prisons and inflicted upon
the prison population. 147 These racial impacts are very real: Black
Americans are five times as likely to be incarcerated in state prisons
as white Americans, and Latinx individuals are 1.3 times as likely
to be incarcerated in state prisons than their white counterparts. 148
Nationally, one in eighty-one Black Americans per 100,000 is in
state prison. 149 And more than half the prison population is Black in
twelve states. 150
Not surprisingly, the failure to treat pandemic response in correctional institutions as a racial justice issue has also led to racially
disparate outcomes of decarceration efforts in some systems.151
Both the failure of political leadership to take the necessary action
to prevent suffering and death in correctional settings during the
pandemic, and the racially disparate decarceration outcomes that did
occur, further point to the need to take proactive, anti-racist
measures.
One tool for the proactive and explicit confrontation of racism
and resulting racial disparities in the criminal legal system is the use

145
See Franco-Paredes et al., supra note 81, at e10 (“Experts in correctional
health and human rights have argued that these decarceration levels are insufficient and raised concerns that pandemic responses could be exacerbating racial
disparities.”).
146
See NELLIS, supra note 116, at 4 (noting that the uprisings after Floyd’s
murder called for police and public safety reform).
147
See id. (“When former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin killed
George Floyd . . . the world witnessed the most racist elements of the U.S. criminal legal system on broad display.”).
148
Id. at 5.
149
Id.
150
See id. (listing the twelve states where over half of the prison population is
Black).
151
See Franco-Paredes et al., supra note 81, at e11 (noting in some states,
white prisoners have been decarcerated at a substantially higher rate than Black
prisoners during the COVID-19 pandemic).
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of racial impact statements. 152 Lawmakers use racial impact statements to evaluate potential racial disparities in proposed legislation
to identify the unforeseen or unacknowledged racial impacts of certain policy choices. 153 The model is similar to fiscal or environmental impact statements, which also forecast the effects of certain policy changes. 154 To date, nine states and the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines Commission have adopted mechanisms to utilize racial
impact statements. 155 Still, more is needed to undo the decades of
laws and policies that have created the racial disparities in our prisons and jails. Retroactive racial justice evaluations of our criminal
statutes and policies are required to minimize or eliminate the racially disparate impacts of these laws. Careful analysis of policies
that determine who is incarcerated and for how long, such as socalled “truth in sentencing” policies, “habitual offender laws,” mandatory minimums, early release mechanisms, parole release and revocation policies, must be done through a racial impact lens. 156 The
repeal of laws and changes in current policies and practices that create racial disparities will be required not only to create a more just
and equitable system, but also to end the era of mass incarceration.
C.
Ensuring the voting rights of all people, regardless of
incarceration or felony conviction status, is necessary to end mass
incarceration.
The pandemic demonstrated political leaders remain unresponsive to the needs of incarcerated people and their communities.157
152
See Nicole D. Porter, Racial Impact Statements, SENT’G PROJECT (June 16,
2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/racial-impact-statements/.
153
Id.
154
See Leah Sakala, Can Racial and Ethnic Impact Statements Address Inequity in Criminal Justice Policy?, URB. INST.: URB. WIRE (Feb. 23, 2018),
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/can-racial-and-ethnic-impact-statements-address-inequity-criminal-justice-policy (“[R]acial impact statements are tools used
in criminal justice policymaking to determine whether pending bills, if enacted,
are likely to create or exacerbate disparate outcomes among people of different
races or ethnicities.”).
155
See Porter, supra note 152.
156
See generally NELLIS, supra note 116, at 14–17 (discussing biased prison
policies and practices as well as recommendations to cure these policies’ negative
effects).
157
See supra note 142.
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The consequences of this lack of response provoke questions about
how to ensure officials are held accountable for both the end of mass
incarceration and the devastating impacts mass incarceration has on
the lives of so many. It is difficult to imagine that those responsible
for the disastrous government response to the pandemic in our prisons would not face accountability or consequences for their inaction; however, this is the situation we now face. 158 The underlying
cause of the lack of consequences is fairly straightforward: We have
a democracy deficit, which allows political leaders to escape accountability for the harm they cause. 159
This democracy deficit can be attributed to the systemic disenfranchisement of the overwhelmingly poor people of color most impacted by the pandemic in correctional facilities. 160 These individuals have almost no voice in elections and therefore possess only limited means with which to demand better treatment by their own government; their forced silence results in their inability to hold their
own government accountable through the political process. 161
As of October 2020, more than 5.2 million Americans remained
unable to vote due to a felony conviction. 162 In forty-eight states, a
felony conviction can result in the loss of an individual’s voting
rights both in prison and in the community. Most of those
See PANDEMIC OVERSIGHT, PANDEMIC RESPONSE ACCOUNTABILITY
COMM., https://www.pandemicoversight.gov (last visited Nov. 7, 2021) (demonstrating the federal government’s pandemic accountability program focuses on
fraud and other financial crimes).
159
See infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text (explaining the democratic
consequences of the systematic disenfranchisement of incarcerated and formerly
incarcerated individuals).
160
See KEVIN MUHITCH & NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, EXPANDING VOTING
RIGHTS TO ALL CITIZENS IN THE ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 3 (2021),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/expanding-voting-rights-to-allcitizens-in-the-era-of-mass-incarceration/ (noting reforms to limit felony disenfranchisement rarely include prison populations which overwhelmingly consist of
poor people of color).
161
See id. at 2 (“People in prison are counted when drawing electoral districts
that determine political representation, even though most lack the right to
vote. . . . By restricting the franchise, states deny fundamental democratic rights
and representation that are otherwise guaranteed to all citizens.”).
162
CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., LOCKED OUT 2020: ESTIMATES OF PEOPLE
DENIED VOTING RIGHTS DUE TO A FELONY CONVICTION 10 (2020),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/locked-out-2020-estimates-ofpeople-denied-voting-rights-due-to-a-felony-conviction/.
158
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disenfranchised are not in prison but are living in the community
under probation or parole supervision or have completed their sentences. 163 Still, almost all people in prison are denied the right to
vote: at present, only Maine, Vermont, Puerto Rico, and the District
of Columbia allow incarcerated people to exercise their franchise. 164
Notably, nearly two-thirds of the over 700,000 people routinely
housed in local jails are held pre-trial with no conviction and are
legally entitled to vote. 165 The remaining population in jails largely
consists of individuals convicted of a misdemeanor offense, which
does not result in disenfranchisement. 166 Yet, only a few of the hundreds of thousands of individuals in jails during an election will actually be able to exercise their right to vote thanks to a lack of polling
places and a lack of access to absentee ballots and information. 167
Unsurprisingly, like all aspects of the criminal legal system, racial disparities in the system cause a devastating loss of political
power for Black and Brown communities: as of 2020, one of every
sixteen Black Americans has lost their right to vote due to felony
disenfranchisement laws. 168
While these enormous loopholes in our democracy undermine
the voice of justice-impacted populations generally, they disproportionately impact Black and Brown communities due to the presence
of massive racial disparities in the criminal legal system. 169 The denial of voting rights to incarcerated people as well as those with prior
felony convictions ensures that political leaders are not held accountable for the harms of mass incarceration and the laws, policies,
and practices that fuel it. 170 Additionally, the government’s ability
to disenfranchise particular communities through the use of mass
Id. at 8 (noting only one-quarter of the disenfranchised population is currently in jail or prison while half of the remaining disenfranchised population have
fully completed their sentences).
164
MUHITCH & NAZGOL, supra note 158, at 8.
165
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incarceration and excessive punishment permanently silences and
disempowers incarcerated individuals and their communities.171
Therefore, in order to end mass incarceration, we must guarantee
that the right to vote is never contingent on felony status or justice
involvement. Democracy cannot long exist where the criminal legal
system acts as its gatekeeper.
CONCLUSION
When I reflect on the ongoing lessons of COVID-19 in this age
of mass incarceration, I think back to Clarence Givens. In a just society, Clarence would be alive today; he would be home with his
family, protected from the pandemic by a vaccine, and supported by
a society that cares for its elders. But Clarence never had a chance
to live in that America: not as a Black man and especially not as a
victim of our senselessness mass incarceration system. Instead,
Clarence died as he served a life sentence for a drug crime he committed decades earlier. Clarence and the thousands of others killed
by the pandemic cannot benefit from the hard lessons of COVID19, but we can. And we must.
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See supra notes 159–61 and accompanying text.

